FORUM DA ENERGIA - 22

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FORUM DA ENERGIA - 22

0. INTRODUÇÃO DOS COORDENADORES: Muuuuuu...TecoTecoTecoTeco

Questões Aerovaquísticas

1. Canadian mad cowing madden Brazilian cowboys with mad “mad cow” story 2. Really Good !!! 3. This is amazing !!! 4. Embraer/Canada/Mad Cow Disease elucidates commercial negotiations 5. Ou est la resistence ?? 6. Why Canada and Not Brazil ? 7. Hey - Wait Just a Minute!!! 8. Things of Western Big Boys. 9. O que falam os jornais canadenses ? 10. Só para descontrair... 11. Just some thoughts.

Petróleo e Meio Ambiente

12. Environmental Best Practices in the Oil & Gas Industries 13. Comments on Oil Spills 14. Oil companies and the environment 15. Commenting on the Brazilian Petroleum Agency New Regulation on Oil Spill Control 16. Comentários sobre a nova regulamentação da ANP para transporte em mar aberto de produtos petroleiros 17. Ensinando a navegar em outros mares

Pesquisa de Campo

18. Pesquisa sobre cultura empresarial do setor petróleo e gás no Brasil

Anúncio de Eventos, Livros e Sites

19. Considerem os seguintes eventos 20. Considerem os seguintes livros 21. Considerem os seguintes sites

Tivemos a satisfação de receber o seu e-mail em nosso Fórum da Energia. A partir de sua inscrição, estaremos enviando para o seu endereço eletrônico debates sobre temas atuais do setor energético. Para cumprir com as normas da boa etiqueta da Internet, comunicamos que, caso prefira não mais receber nossas mensagens, bastará enviar-nos um email confirmando o seu desejo de sair da lista. O senhor(a) também poderá contribuir com opiniões sobre os temas em discussão ou sugerindo novos temas.

Todos os comentários aos temas em discussão serão inclusos no Fórum da Energia seguinte (a menos que o autor manifestar-se contrariamente). Os comentários deverão ser endereçados ao seguinte email: edsantos@iee.usp.br

Comentários também podem ser enviados aos respectivos autores, mas, neste caso, não teremos condições de intermediar os envios. Os contatos deverão ser feitos diretamente. Neste Fórum não existe nenhuma análise prévia dos comentários enviados. Portanto, todos os participantes serão responsáveis pelo conteúdo de sua contribuição. Sugerimos apenas que verifiquem se a contribução a ser enviada é pertinente com o propósito deste Fórum.

Abraço,

Professores Edmilson M. dos Santos & Regina Zamith

Fórum da Energia 22: 16/02/01 edsantos@iee.usp.br

0. INTRODUÇÃO DOS COORDENADORES: Muuuuuu...TecoTecoTecoTeco

Questões Aerovaquísticas

1. Canadian mad cowing madden Brazilian cowboys with mad “mad cow” story 2. Really Good !!! 3. This is amazing !!! 4. Embraer/Canada/Mad Cow Disease elucidates commercial negotiations 5. Ou est la resistence ?? 6. Why Canada and Not Brazil ? 7. Hey - Wait Just a Minute!!! 8. Things of Western Big Boys. 9. O que falam os jornais canadenses ? 10. Só para descontrair... 11. Just some thoughts.

Petróleo e Meio Ambiente

12. Environmental Best Practices in the Oil & Gas Industries 13. Comments on Oil Spills 14. Oil companies and the environment 15. Commenting on the Brazilian Petroleum Agency New Regulation on Oil Spill Control 16. Comentários sobre a nova regulamentação da ANP para transporte em mar aberto de produtos petroleiros 17. Ensinando a navegar em outros mares

Pesquisa de Campo

18. Pesquisa sobre cultura empresarial do setor petróleo e gás no Brasil

Anúncio de Eventos, Livros e Sites

19. Considerem os seguintes eventos 20. Considerem os seguintes livros 21. Considerem os seguintes sites

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 0. INTRODUÇÃO DOS COORDENADORES De: Edmilson Santos (Programa de Energia USP) - edsantos@iee.usp.br Regina Zamith (Programa de Energia USP) - zamith@link.com.br

Apesar de estarmos com um número extremamente animador de propostas e contribuições para o Fórum, temos sido atropelados pelo destino, que insiste em nos trazer temas urgentess, que ultrapassam as prioridades praviamente definidas, exigindo alguma manifestação forense. Pedimos para que continuem ligados e tenham um pouco de paciência, pois seus comentários serão TODOS difundidos e colocados para debate. Neste Fórum da Energia 22, ousamos sair brevemente das nossas esferas energéticas, para tratarmos da questão AEROVAQUÍSTICA do momento. Esta tangente a temas alheios permitem-nos refletir sobre aspectos importantes das relações e transações internacionais. Neste sentido, nossa navegação por águas desconhecidas pode inspirar-nos a aprender lições igualmente válidas e aplicáveis ao setor energético. Veremos que as reflexões que se seguem deságuam necessariamente na questão da ÉTICA, o que nos permitirá retornar a este tema encantador, o qual já tivemos oportunidade de discutir em Fóruns anteriores. Esperamos que as divagações deste Fórum, antes de irritar os especialistas, possam motivar os amigos forenses à leitura e reflexão.

Abraço,

Edmilson dos Santos & Regina Zamith

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Questões Aerovaquísticas

1. Canadian mad cowing madden Brazilian cowboys with mad “mad cow” story De: Edmilson dos Santos - edsantos@iee.usp.br

Dada a importância do tema, não porque tenha muito a ver com energia, mas porque fornece ensinamentos fundamentais para a nossa área energética, merecendo, portanto, um comentário nosso, apresentamos-lhes uma pequena reflexão em inglês, sobre o conflito recente entre Brasil e Canadá na esfera do comércio internacional.

--------------- Dear friends,

How is it difficult to talk about environment and/or energy issues if we forget that we are leaving in a global "trade mind" world. Moreover, it is also interesting to see how difficult it is going to be the new global trade debate as emerging countries start challenging developed countries in niche hi-tech markets. The reactions and developments might be unpredictable. . After its privatization in the early 1990s, the Brazilian aircraft manufacture, Embraer, became one of the most successful company in the aircraft business, jumping in few years to the 4th place (far behind Boing and Airbus), but just next door of Canadian Bombardier that used to command a kind of global monopoly in the production of small and middle class airplanes. Of course, both companies have been helped with illegal subsidies from their governments. This has raised an international dispute, first between the two companies and second between the two countries. Canada brought the case to the WTO and Brazil lost, being obliged to phase out or change its subsidy structure. Canada asked more, requiring that some already negotiated and sold agreements signed by the Brazilian company should be canceled since the Brazilian company had won the contract with an unfair proposal. Having not been accepted this claim, Canada won a compensation with the right to retaliate Brazilian exports to Canada in any sector up to a value of US$1.4 billion. Brazil complained at the WTO, but it lost again and the Canadian retaliation right was confirmed. Things were still in dicussion since Canada was doubtful about its advantages on retaliating.

Then, a couple of days ago, Canada prohibited the imports of Brazilian beef saying that Brazil had not sent the right papers proving the country as a free zone of "mad cow desease". The notice came as a bomb. The USA and Mexico immediately followed Canada as expected under NAFTA’s provisions to deal with those issues. The Brazilian government sent its diplomats and the Agricultural Minister to the USA and Mexico to urgent talks. The American government accepted to avoid a recall of Brazilian beef from the American supermarkets which would have been catastrophic to the Brazilian meat industry.

The Canadian/Brazilian conflict became an open trade war, with beligerants statements from both governments. All this mess having taken place just before the Continental Presidential summit (the America's Forum), previewed to happen in Quebec, Canada. In this meeting, the USA was expecting to push forward the idea of anticipating from 2005 to 2003 the first steps towards the construction of the AFTA (American Free Trade Agreement). As known, Brazil is in strong opposition against this anticipation and against the whole idea of the AFTA, prefering to focus firstly on the structuring of Mercosul, the South American Free Trade Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay). Under the new lights of the Brazil/Canada conflict, the Brazilian President has already reacted saying he will not come to Quebec if Canada doesn't change its position in the beef banishing issue (Actually, I am not sure he will be warmfully welcomed in Quebec, Bombardier’s Home).

--------------- That is the story. Now, I am wondering if we can learn useful lessons from this case and apply them into our energy sector. I raise the first doubts:

1. Can we consider the Canadian behavior as cheating?

2. To some extent, this case shows to have positive aspects to Brazilian consumers either. The Brazilian bureucracy seems to have been stupid enough by delaying to send important documents asked by the Canadian sanitary authorities. But this is just the top of the Iceberg, because the Brazilian authorities as well as the Brazilian beef producers have also failed to inform the Brazilian society about the country’s imports of European cows. We don’t know the final location and situation of those animals. Therefore, as always happen, the Brazilians are the last to be informed. We need international pressures to learn strange things from ourselves. Why is it so difficult to build transparency in this country?

3. But clearly, the case worked as a wonderful excuse for the Canadian government to retaliate Brazil as previewed by the WTO’s decision on the Airplane business. Is this retaliation a fair trading practice? We have to remember that it has been used a very appelling, serious and worrying "mad cow desease" aargument to justify the retaliation. It is not just an execution of WTO’s decision.

4. With the retaliation, Canada achieved the goal of weakening the Brazilian competitive position in the global beef market. But this success might be an overdose since the Canadian action carried not only the USA and Mexico, but might have a global impact. If Europeans get scared about the Brazilian beef, the damages will be serious. Spite of having never registered a mad cow desease case, this is always possible in the future, particularly if we keep importing animals from elsewhere.

5. Similar conflict cases are very likely in the international energy trading. Particularly in what regards SPECs of energies, but also in what regards the construction of import barriers. For example, the recent decision of the CNPE (National Concil for Energy Policy) to limit the Brazilian imports of electricity from Bolivia, Argentina or Uruguay, can be seen as an energy banishment . Why should Bolivian energy cause more damages to Brazilian cosumers than domestic energy? Aren’t we just trying to protect potential more expensive investments in the country, therefore potential big constructions, therefore, potential business, therefore potential open doors for corruption?

6. Finally, I am wondering whether President Bush really wants to push forward and faster the AFTA’s ideal. If so, don’t you think it is already time for him to call the Brasilian President and the Canadian Premier Minister and tell them: "Look guys, it was very nice, but enough is enough, let's stop this mess" ….

2. Really Good !!! De: Rogerio Miranda - r.s.d.miranda@dundee.ac.uk

Prof. Edmilson,

This is really good. Let's see the reaction of the international trade experts on the list.

3. This is amazing !!! De: Dick Startzman - startzma@spindletop.tamu.edu

Dear Edmilson,

Thanks. This is an amazing, but not surprising, story. Every country has pulled this kind of stunt, including Brazil (cf the micro-computer tariffs.) The main goal should be to publish these incidents and let the people who do this kind of thing face public examination.

Regards, Dick Startzman

4. Embraer/Canada/Mad Cow Disease elucidates commercial negotiations De: Bruce Bamer Johnson - FIA/USP - bjohnson@usp.br

Dear Edmilson,

Although marginally relevant, as you mention, the Embraer/Canada/Mad Cow Disease case may help lucidate commercial negotiations which can affect commodities trading, including energy. One aspect of this case has not been mentioned in the press, but may be helpful in understanding the "mad canuk syndrome" that has apparently become endemic in Ottawa. It is difficult to understand why the Canadian government has so suddenly and so radically changed its foreign relations policy, which has for so many years invested in deepening its relations with underdeveloped and emerging economies, through diverse financial and technical cooperation funds and agencies such as IRDC. It appears to be madness, as they have effectively destroyed, in Brasil and many developing countries, all of the goodwill they have spent so much for such a long time to create.

I believe that this can only be understood in the context of Canadian politics, which like any national politics, is not necessarily determined by rational process. As is generally known, Canada has an internal division between the French speaking population, located principally in Quebec, and the English speaking population in the rest of the country. Independent Quebec was the object of a referendum, recently (about 3 years ago) which lost by the narrowest of margins. This is to say that the Quebecois are continually on the verge of declaring independence from the rest of the country, and this is the dominant issue in Canadian politics.

As it happens, Bombardier is located in Quebec, is the only significant high tech, high value added and technology intensive industry in French speaking Canada, creating a significant number of high salary jobs. The rest of Quebec presents high unemployment, low salaries, generalized poverty. Quebec is Canada's Nordeste, and federal policies have done little to ameliorate this situation. Bombardier was a small company which started out making snowmobiles and ended up making aircraft in segments that the big firms had ignored (regional aviation). Therefore it has enormous symbolic importance to French Canadians, in addition to the true economic value to the Province of Quebec.

As the company is threatened by Embraer, as most virtual monopolies eventually are threatened by newcomers, given their accommodation and incompetence, Embraer has become the symbol of threat to the regional identity of French Canadians, who tend to be intolerant, racist, subjectively fragile and without other options. The French Canadians appealed to Ottawa, and given the delicate situation in national politics, Ottawa sees no options but that of providing unrestrained support to French Canada represented by Bombardier. This, of course, aside from the French Canadian origin of Mssr. Crétien, the monumental campaign contributions by Bombardier, etc.

What can be done to short circuit the commercial war that has already been declared by Quebec, and supported implicitly by Ottawa? Perhaps one path is to amplify the venue. The issue has enormous symbolic importance to the 5 million French Canadian, little direct importance to the other 20 million Canadians, and almost no importance to NAFTA, which automatically followed the Canadian initiative, except in terms of the danger that provincial politics can have on national and international relations.

Brasil obviously cannot tolerate commercial war based on unethical actions by Quebec/Canada, à la mad cow. Pillory and mockery might be effective, if the French Canadians weren't so fragile. The rest of Canada is highly sensitive and may require more rational behavior from Ottawa via the economic capital in Toronto .

Brasil needs allies and collateral issues to stop the war, in the context of NAFTA, the future of AFTA or OMC, which does not seem to be very difficult to arrange, given the threat of war. It would be funny if it weren't so serious. It is more than funny; it is ridiculous, and nothing better than some biting Brazilian humor to help the world recognize the situation for what it is.

5. Ou est la resistence ?? De: Edmilson dos Santos - edsantos@iee.usp.br

Based on Professor Bruce Johnson's excellent comment and intriguing point, I start understanding why the French are so silent on all of this. Actually, I keep thinking what are strategic partners all about?

Yes, because, the Brazilian aircraft manufacture Embraer has recently sold about 40% of its shares to the French Dessault/Matra, building up a real binational strategic joint-venture. However, since the conflict between Embraer and Bombardier broke out, the French have not really acted as strategic partners, being absolutely silent and taking a neutral role. I am wondering if it is not again the typical De Gaullian behavior of giving more power to culture and bloody than to business. By trying to support the former colony, Quebec, the almost binational company has actually to count upon only its Brazilian forces. If so, shouldn't Embraer look for other strategic partners rather than the French, say the British or the Germans?

After all, the competition climate between Embraer and Bombardier shall not cool down tomorrow. Actually, the battle will last very very long and will get worse.

6. Why Canada and Not Brazil ? De: Thomas Walde - Thomaswalde@cs.com

As far as I can see it, Brazil consistently lost out in the WTO dispute settlement process which does suggest its case is weaker. I see no reason why that process should be biased in favour of Canada rather than Brazil.

7. Hey - Wait Just a Minute!!! De: Todd Weiler - tweiler@naftalaw.org

Mr. dos Santos:

The capital of Canada is Ottawa. We here in Toronto are ashamed of what has happened. I personally think it's because of the heavy snow falls they've experienced in Ottawa this year. Their brains have apparently been numbed by the cold winds blowing south from Quebec.

Funny how Brazil is named the third world country in this dispute, when all of the evidence suggests that the Brazilian government's relationship with Embraer is totally transparent and it appears that Bombardier appears to have its own secret seat at the prime minister's cabinet table. Truly disgraceful.

8. Things of Western Big Boys. De: Lai Hoikean - Kuala Lumpur/Malaysia - Petronas - laihk@petronas.com.my

Dear Prof Eddie,

I read your article on Mad Cow Disease case. It is interesting and invite a lot of thoughts. It seems to me that this “Canadian/Brazilain beef trade dispute” is quite typical trade tactis from the the big boys. We have experience that in this part of the world. The case of Shrimp/Turtle, Malaysia's investment in Iran (ILSA case) readily come to mind. Without knowing enough facts, I tend to agree with you that Canada is probably felt soured by the competition coming from Brazilain Embraer. They are probably felt even more threatened by Brazilian green beef. I am sure, your Brazilain green beef is much cheaper in term of production cost compared to Canadian beef or beef from somewhere else. It is strange that Canada banned imports of beef from Brazil when there is no mad cow disease reported yet from Brazil. As suggestion, perhaps Asian countries like Malaysia should trade more for your green beef rather tha dependent upon beefs from Australia/New Zealan and Europe. They all use meat feed it seems. Send trade delegates here, Prof Eddie to sell your green beef. You need to market and advertise your green products.

For whatever reasons, looking at the world wide trade disputes/issues, it is clear to me that the bog boys are using trade as a big weapon to whip the smaller players whenever you are gaining market competitiveness, in your case you probably is gaining beef market share in Canada following the European mad cow scare. Mind you, now the AFTA is back in fashion, there may be other standards/burdens imposed on you in due course via AFTA. We also have AFTA here (ASEAN/Asia Free Trade Area), save that we do not have western big boys. So it may be easier for us to inch toward a final AFTA here but by no means easy.

These are my thoghts for this time.

9. O que falam os jornais canadenses ? De: Centro INNOVA/INNOVA Center - stiraden@mail.mty.itesm.mx

Caro Edmilson,

Sou brasileira e trabalho em um programa com mudanca climatica no Mexico. Li seu e-mail sobre a questao Brasil X Canada e me pareceu interessante te encaminhar artigos publicados em jornais canadenses que recebi sobre essa questao. Os textos mostram que os canadenses ja estao concientes dos interesses reais de seu governo. Espero que seja de seu interresse.

Saludos,

Saenandoah Tiradentes Dutra Programa de Cambio Climatico Centro INNOVA para el Desarrollo Sostenible

---------------- POSTED AT 3:08 AM EST Friday, February 09

Scientists rip mad-cow 'ruse'

By MARK MacKINNON From Friday's Globe and Mail Ottawa — Canada's controversial ban on Brazilian beef is a ruse motivated by politics and a trade war rather than health concerns, two senior Health Canada scientists say. In interviews with The Globe and Mail, they said there is no sustainable argument for singling out Brazilian beef products ahead of those imported from other countries. One of them added that the ban was decided upon by managers without consulting the scientists who actually study the beef. "There was no consultation with us, the scientists," said a senior scientist close to the file who asked not to be named. "Brazilian beef poses no danger that we know of. No more than any other country. Why not Australia, Argentina, India or any other country we import beef from? Why is Brazil picked on? It's the trade war." Last week, Canada banned Brazilian beef products, citing a "theoretical risk" that they could be contaminated with mad-cow disease. While Brazil has never had a case of the disease, Canada had one in 1993. In fact, some experts say Brazilian beef is among the safest in the world, because many of its herds have been grass-fed since as far back as 1983. Mad-cow disease, technically known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, is spread through feeding animals parts of dead animals. The practice was legal in Canada until 1997. "What happened with the Brazilian beef was, in my opinion, a ruse," the senior scientist said. "They already had a fight going on with Brazil because of the plane thing and the WTO. They felt they may as well hit Brazil with this, since we don't import very much beef from them anyway." He said Health Canada also benefits from the perception that it is taking action to counter the spread of mad-cow disease. Margaret Haydon, a Health Canada scientist once reprimanded for speaking out about internal pressures to approve a controversial bovine growth hormone, also said she believes the ban has nothing to do with health concerns. "In my opinion, I don't think there's any difference [in risk] between Brazilian beef and Canadian beef. With the aircraft dispute, it's more a political move than a health one for the Canadian government." The ban has sparked an uproar in Brazil, which believes the move is related to a continuing trade dispute between the two countries over subsidies to Montreal-based jet maker Bombardier Inc. and its Brazilian rival Embraer SA. The affair has made Canada a target of resentment in the South American country. Restaurant owners have begun displaying signs advertising that they don't sell Canadian food, and have been dumping Canadian whisky out by the bottle. Brazilian politicians are considering blocking the import of Canadian goods, and are talking about backing out of a proposed free-trade agreement of the Americas because of the ban and the aircraft dispute. Brazil is also considering suing Canada at the International Court of Justice in The Hague over losses resulting from the beef ban. Protesters in Brasilia delivered a cow to the Canadian embassy Thursday and offered to barbecue it to prove it safe. The embassy's business attaché, Jose Herran-Lima, said he would hold off on the barbecue until Canada is sure Brazil is free of mad-cow disease. Industry Minister Brian Tobin, embroiled in the Brazil file since he announced $2-billion in new subsidies to Bombardier last month, said Thursday that the trade dispute and the beef ban aren't connected in any way. "It has absolutely nothing to do with any trade matter. ... I think it's important the people of Brazil appreciate that. It's purely a food issue, purely a safety issue." While Canada only imports about $10-million worth of Brazilian beef annually, most of it canned, the ban has been damaging. The United States and Mexico, Canada's free-trade partners, were obliged to follow suit, though both have since announced they're reviewing the ban. Bill Westman, a U.S. agricultural official based in Brasilia, said Thursday he believes there is "no risk whatsoever" of BSE in Brazilian beef. Michael McBain, the national co-ordinator for the Canadian Health Coalition, a non-governmental organization, said that if Canada was serious about cracking down on BSE, it would have introduced much broader measures than simply targeting Brazilian beef. He pointed out that according to Statistics Canada, Canada imported 2.8 million kilograms of meat products between 1996 and 2000 from European countries known to have mad-cow outbreaks. "This move against Brazil has no credibility whatsoever as a health measure. They picked a country way down the risk list — you can't get safer meat," he said. "All the evidence points to this being a trumped-up pretext." With a report from Agence France-Presse

---------------- Our war with Brazil Friday, February 9, 2001 'We are becoming something more than amigos. We are becoming una gran familia." That, believe it or not, was Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, speaking in 1998 and looking ahead to this year -- when leaders of the Americas will visit Quebec City for the third in their series of summit meetings. If this is a family, Canada is fast taking on the role of the bratty brother who steals your toys and hides them because Mom likes you best. That is what the woeful conduct of its dispute with Brazil over sales of passenger jets amounts to. What began as a battle for market share between Bombardier Inc. of Montreal and Embraer SA of Brazil is on the brink of becoming a full-scale trade war, with major implications for the upcoming April summit and for Canada's relations with the largest country in Latin America. For years, Canada claimed Brazil was flouting global trade rules by offering loans at below-market rates to Embraer's customers. Repeatedly, World Trade Organization dispute panels agreed. Last month, saying it was frustrated with Brazil's refusal to abide by the decisions, Canada stooped to essentially the same practice -- offering its own guarantees on cut-rate loans to help Bombardier win business among the world's regional airlines. So much for the moral high ground. To make matters worse, Canada has now slapped a ban on imports of processed Brazilian beef, citing the risk of mad-cow disease. Were we persuaded that this was evidence of a get-tougher attitude in Ottawa on food safety, we would be heartened. We are not. As far as we can tell, the ban was imposed not because of hard evidence but because the Brazilian press carried reports saying cattle were imported to that country from Europe, where the disease has devastated the beef industry. Ottawa denies a link between the beef ban and the Bombardier-Embraer dispute. But if the Prime Minister's Office was aware the ban was about to be imposed -- and please tell us it was -- then someone, perhaps Mr. Chrétien himself, allowed it to stand. At any rate, mild dismay among Brazilians has now blossomed into public and official outrage. Yesterday the Communications Minister hauled representatives of Canadian telecom companies into his office in Brasilia and warned them they face unpleasant consequences if Mr. Chrétien doesn't call off the dogs. What on Earth is the Prime Minister thinking? Here is a man anxious to portray himself as a leader in the Americas. His officials are in the final stages of hammering out a draft regional free-trade agreement, up for adoption just 10 weeks from now at the Quebec City summit. Pride of place will go to Mr. Chrétien and Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, as two of the longest-serving leaders. And he picks a fight with the guy. Not only with Mr. Cardoso, but with the second most populous country in the hemisphere -- a nation whose support is crucial to any free-trade project. Ottawa's recklessness is threatening more than just the smooth conduct of the summit. Other Canadian companies besides Bombardier do business with Brazil, and thousands work for them. Why should their jobs be held hostage to a dispute they have nothing to do with? Why does Bombardier have such easy access to Ottawa's corporate safety net? Whatever happened to la grande famille canadienne? This unseemly mud-wrestling is internally divisive and internationally embarrassing. Happy talk about familias is no substitute for leadership. In the household of the Americas, the leaders will most likely be found among the grownups.

---------------- Brazil has much at stake in jet dogfight Embraer's success seen by government as crucial to nation's industrial development MARK MACKINNON SAO JOSE DOS CAMPOS Saturday, February 3, 2001 BRAZIL -- A sleek collection of factories and office towers set against a background of multi-storey homes, Sao Jose dos Campos looks, from the highway heading into town, positively First World. The slums that dominate other Brazilian centres are almost nonexistent in this city of 500,000 nestled between the gentle green hills and scattered settlements of Sao Paulo state. Instead, corporate logos dot the landscape -- defence contractors, information technology startups, multinational communications firms and a fledgling space program. Tens of thousands of Brazilians work in the city, in jobs that are high-paying by the developing country's standards. Tens of thousands more apply annually for jobs here. If Brazil had a Silicon Valley, a high-tech economic engine, it would be here, 100 kilometres northeast of Sao Paulo city. And at the economic heart of Sao Jose dos Campos is Embraer SA, the country's home-grown aerospace giant, with about 10,000 employees of its own. "Embraer is good for the city," said Carlos da Silva, a chauffeur in the area. "It is the centre of everything." Somewhere in this picture is the reason Brazil is more than willing to go toe-to-toe with Canada in what would surely be a mutually harmful trade war, one that revolves around an argument over who subsidizes their aerospace industry more. Sao Jose dos Campos is a model of industrial development the government wants to replicate across this impoverished country. It can't let the working models it has die off -- at any cost. Since privatizing in 1994, Embraer has rapidly become the world's fourth-largest commercial airplane producer and the blood rival of Montreal-based Bombardier Inc. Two years ago, Embraer passed mining firm Vale do Rio Doce to become the country's largest exporter. In a country where horse-drawn carts compete for space on city roads with the latest Mercedes model, that's raised hopes of a high-tech revolution. "Embraer has become, in a sense, a symbol -- just like Bombardier is in Canada -- of success," said Jose Alfredo Graca Lima, Brazil's top trade negotiator. "As a country, we are concerned that we should produce more technologically sophisticated goods." Those outside Brazil, he said, do not understand the company's importance in helping modernize the country's economy. Its success is crucial, he argues, if Brazil is to change its image from that of a producer of bananas, coffee and shoes. Embraer is the byproduct of one of the few examples of long-term planning by the Brazilian government that worked out as planned. In the early 1950s, the government established the Aerospace Technological Institute, which created in subsequent decades a critical mass of well-trained aerospace engineers. The Brazilian government also created Embraer, originally to manufacture military planes, and ran it as a public company until 1994, losing millions of dollars in the process. After it was privatized, Mauricio Bothelo, the company's president and chief executive officer, launched what he called the "Redemption Project" -- turning the company's focus from the military side toward a regional jet market still in its infancy. It was a prescient move. The company's assembly-line-like hangars here are full of dozens of 37-, 44-, and 50-seat jets in various stages of construction. The multitude of logos painted on the sides -- Air France, Swissair, Continental Airlines, American Airlines -- demonstrate the company's widespread customer base. The company has built up an order backlog of almost 1,000 regional jets. With gross sales jumping from $377-million (U.S.) in 1996 to $2.7-billion last year, Embraer has emerged as a strong No. 2 in the regional jet market, trailing only Bombardier. Some sources suggest Embraer, which manufactures cheaper planes than Bombardier, largely because of lower labour costs, may even be winning the regional jet war. According to the Airline Monitor trade magazine, Embraer won 898 jet orders in the past five years through the end of last year, compared with 796 for Bombardier. Now Embraer is moving into another Bombardier-dominated area, the corporate jet market. Bombardier is expected soon to announce a contract to build up to 150 jets -- 75 firm orders and 75 options -- for Air Wisconsin, a United Airlines affiliate, numbers that would push Bombardier back in front. But there's a creeping feeling at the company's Montreal headquarters that Embraer is eating away at its business. And in Bombardier's eyes, they're doing it unfairly, with the help of illegal government subsidies. Five years ago, believing its companies were at a disadvantage when competing internationally with those in the developed world, Brazil established Pro-ex, a program that offers cut-rate loans to buyers of Brazilian exports. The government and most of the Brazilian media see Pro-ex as a necessary equalizer for a country where the cost of financing (interest rates regularly hover in the 15-per-cent range) is several times higher than in more industrialized nations. No company has made better use of the program since it was created than Embraer. "I would love to have a level playing field, to have Bombardier's level of financing," Henrique Rzezinski, Embraer's vice-president of external relations, said in an interview at the company's headquarters this week. "The fact is Canada is a mature economy, a stable economy, with social conditions we would love to see in Brazil. Canada no longer needs a Pro-ex." Pro-ex is at the core of a dizzying series of World Trade Organization complaints and an increasingly heated exchange of undiplomatic rhetoric between the two sides. It also has Canada and Brazil at the brink of a trade war, with the WTO having given Canada the green light to slap punitive tariffs on Brazilian goods entering the country, and Brazil threatening to retaliate in kind if it does. The WTO originally declared Pro-ex illegal because it offered loans at well below the market rate. Brazil believes modifications it has made since have brought the program into compliance, an assertion that Canada is once more challenging. Last month, Canada opened a new front, offering a Bombardier buyer a cut-rate loan package through the secretive Canada Account of the Export Development Corp. In announcing the move, Industry Minister Brian Tobin declared it was a necessary response to continued Brazilian subsidies. To Brazil, it was business as usual for Canada, except that this time it was forced to admit the subsidy after it was reported in The Globe and Mail. Mr. Rzezinski charges that Canada is as deep into the export subsidy game as Brazil is. The only difference is that Canada does it much more quietly, through the secretive EDC, which doesn't have to report who it loans money to and under what conditions. Here in Brazil, Canada's stance against Pro-ex smacks of hypocritical First World imperialism, of a developed nation trying to deny Brazil the tools it used itself to build up companies like Bombardier. Canada, some point out, hasn't taken the United States and the European Union to the WTO over their persistent agricultural subsidies. But it's quick to use all the weapons at its disposal in this fight. "The message being sent is that Canada exports airplanes, Brazil exports coffee beans, and that's the way it should stay," Mr. Rzezinski said. "If Embraer was based in Copenhagen, we would not be having the same kind of dispute."

10. Só para descontrair... De: dimas.lazarini@embraer.com.br

Caro Edmilson,

Só para descontrair, segue a informação do Macaco Simão, aquele que escreve uma coluna no Jornal Folha de SP. É + / - isso: O Canadá ficou apavorado porque pensou que a capital do Brasil é "Boi nos Aires" .

Agora falando sério, para mim, que acompanho há anos este assunto, é evidente e muito estranho a forma com que agiu o Canadá, determinando a retirada imediata dos produtos derivados de carne das prateleiras, agindo como se já tivesse comprovado alguma coisa. Fica difícil avaliar pricipalmente com olhos de patriota, pelo fato de não saber a Verdade sobre quais as informações sobre o rebanho brasileiro foram solicitadas e quais de fato foram enviadas aos Canadenses, principalmente quando conhecemos a morosidade e ineficiencia de muitos orgãos públicos. Então, apenas pelo "achometro", acredito puramente em retaliação embalada pelo caso dos aviões e tambem aproveitando o embalo, para proteção dos produtores locais.

11. Just some thoughts. De: Anônimo - Representado aqui por edsantos@iee.usp.br

Edmilson,

Thanks for your very interesting note. My opinion is as follows :

Unfair trade practices, including illegal government subsidies is always a grey area specially in the aircraft market. It is extremely common practice for govt subsidies to exist and in the course of the last year in three different aircraft transactions, I have seen this happen. It is an accepted, though illegal practice and takes all kinds of complicated forms and shapes. This however does not worry me. To object to this kind of business ethics is to be stupid and naive. The global market is an extremely competitive place and let's not forget that the biggest players in this market are sovereigns.

What I really feel is unethical, is the practice of using political and economic blackmail to promote commercial cross border trade oriented transactions. For example (and this is strictly confidential) I know that Bombardier has been actively marketing countries like Kazakhstan & Uzbekistan. They visit the potential buyers in these countries with the CIA and use the threat of Russian menace to convince people that it is better to do business with NATO aligned countries. Having said that though, it is not as if Embraer is clean either. Recently, they managed to get into the fighter aircraft race with BAE Systems in India one year after BAE had been negotiating with the Govt of India. There is no doubt that money changed hands somewhere for this to be possible.

In the energy sector, I guess after the arms industry we are the industry most accustomed to unfair practices. I refuse to see how governments for example in Gabon, Angola can change without TotalFinaElf being involved. I also refuse to believe that Shell manages to do business in Nigeria without lining some govt officials pocket.

All in all, it is not a nice world that we live in and politicians and statesmen may spend 10 years on the table discussing issues like these and it will never affect the way the business world works. When stakes run into millions of dollars, inhibitions and morality are usually thrown out of the window. In the end, the rational person will accept the world as it is and under these constraints try to do the best he can for the most amount of people.

Just some thoughts.

Petróleo e Meio Ambiente

O tópico anterior nos conduziu a introduzir novamente a questão da ética nos negócios. Este também é um tema cada vez mais importante para as empresas de energia, sempre acusadas de viverem em um mundo de corrupção e comportamentos pouco éticos. Em particular, a ética perante o meio ambiente adquire contornos imprevisíveis, obrigando o setor energético a encontrar novas posturas, mais sustentáveis. Portanto, a seguir, o tema Petróleo - Meio Ambiente e Sustentabilidade é novamente tratado neste Fórum.

12. Environmental Best Practices in the Oil & Gas Industries De: Thomas Walde - Thomaswalde@CS.COM

Publicação Original no Fórum ENATRES do CEPMLP da Universidade de Dundee, Escócia.

I am a member of the intl council for oil and environment. I have written a draft "vision" statement on their request and invite comments:

Environmental Best Practices in the Oil & Gas Industries: Towards Sustainable Development - Draft "Vision" Paper for the International Council for Oil and Environment

The international oil and gas industries are vital for the survival of modern societies and civilisation - and are likely to remain so for a long time to come. The stable supply of oil and gas is a matter of political priority for all societies and not a matter of normal functioning of markets as even modest problems with supply in some European countries in 2000 has shown again very vividly. But the oil and gas industries are not much liked. Their activities - as strategic as they are in essence everywhere - are seen as inextricably linked to risks of climate change, viewed now as the most severe risk to the global environment. Their upstream operations are fraught with environmental risks which have become well known in developed countries: oil spills, safety disasters, problems with decommissioning. These risks are magnified in countries with a weak institutional environment, i.e. transition and developing countries. Here, pre-existing environmental damages from past operations (e.g. lake Maracaibo; Nigerian delta; Siberian pipeline) are a reflection of past mismanagement and current neglect - both on the side of governments and operators. These more "technical" environmental disasters of great visibility are now being compounded by damages which affect the social fabric of host societies, sometimes through technical environmental damages affecting local people (Nigerian Delta), sometimes related to the ability of petroleum endowments to exacerbate civil insecurity, wars and inter-ethnic conflict in under-developed governance situations. The international petroleum industry is now held co-responsible for such disasters even it is merely technically present in societies with low governance quality.

It is for these reasons imperative for the oil and gas industry not to rest in complacency and self-satisfaction over what looks to the technical people in the industry as a professionally well-run system of modern environmental management. The causes of dissatisfaction with the oil industry - affecting its legitimacy and its public opinion-based "license to operate" - go beyond professional negligence and express a widespread negative sentiment towards the legitimacy and public acceptance of the industry and its operations. The oil and gas industry must therefore do more than merely rely on its engineering professionalism. It has a - moral, political and even financial - responsibility to bring oil and gas operations worldwide closer to the ideal of "sustainable development", to work hard at developing best practices in dialogue, collaboration and competition and of disseminating the theory, but also the practical application of "best practices" worldwide, even in situations of weak institutions and under-developed governance. But that is not enough to allay the reservations of public opinion and the "civil society" about the petroleum industry. The industry also needs to engage pro-actively - not just as spin-doctoring exercises after regularly occurring crises - with the major stakeholders - with regulatory agencies, public opinion, the relevant NGOs making up "civil society", the universities and consumers in a continuous dialogue to improve best practices - and their public acceptance, to disseminate them, to review its commercial strategies in light of the sustainable development target and to develop a perception of its role as a necessary, legitimate and forward-looking actor in the global society. Such a process can not be undertaken solely by the industry, but needs to involve elements of independent assessment and wide-ranging consultation with all relevant stake-holders. It could be considered as a form of managing the political risk to the oil industry arising from future accidents and implication in future global environmental damages which could endanger the petroleum industry's public acceptance and legitimacy, and thereby lead to restrictions which could be beyond what is reasonable and which could undermine the strategic public service this industry is in fact providing to the global society.

But it is not only the industry, but also governments and NGOs which need to make a greater effort to understand and help to improve the strategic direction of the petroleum industry. Governments tend to shift, often aimlessly, between a close technical and professional relationship with an industry that is strategic for providing essential public services, on one hand and, on the other, not well thought through political activism to satisfy the political pressures originating in NGO-initiated PR-actions, often managed through focused dramatisation of often inevitable single-event conflicts involving the industry. Governments need to be involved in setting a regulatory framework that is more forward-looking than a reaction to a specific media event, which employs modern and efficient means of oil industry regulation and which formulates public expectations formed after extensive and well informed public and stake-holder debate.

Similarly, NGOs are not without blame and responsibility. While they fulfil a legitimate function in critical observation of oil industry operations and in highlighting the frequent contrast between public statements and corporate practice, they need to earn legitimacy through a professional, technically correct and truthful methodology. NGOs or "civil society" is not legitimated by democratic election or market-based competition. It is, however, accountable for its often considerable influence on the political process and such accountability must equally stem from compliance with professional codes of honesty, truthfulness and professionalism.

The oil and gas industry will move towards the target of sustainable development and greater acceptance and public legitimacy of its services which are essential for modern civilisation through a greater, pro-active effort at professionally competent and honest dialogue and engagement with governments, "civil society" and other stakeholders. To facilitate this process, is the objective of the ICOE programme.

These are the key principles which inform the ICEO programme:

· Examination of current, and continuously evolving best practices in the area of environmental protection in the upstream oil & gas sector and presentation of such investigation in a way that helps to disseminate them rapidly and effectively, in particular in areas with weaker formal and material standards;

· Extensive involvement of relevant stake-holders, in particular industry, government, independent researchers and competent NGOs of "civil society" in the process of formulating the elements of the research programmes, in reviewing preliminary results and in designing an effective methodology for dissemination of the results;

· Development of a "global approach" which involves the major petroleum regions of the world, the major actors (both private and state-owned industry; major professional, industry and intergovernmental organisations in the field; major NGOs and research institutes) encourages the emergence of regional centres with the ICOE working rather to facilitate the exchange of substantive and procedural expertise than dominating it. ICOE thus aims to constitute an authoritative and respected independent global network for an informed debate on environmental policies in this sector; for raising the consciousness of key actors, both professionals and policy-makers, of the risks and implications of environmental protection and for creating a dialogue-based framework for moving towards accepted forms of sustainable development.

· Emphasis on setting in motion both a continuous process, but also on producing tangible results (as indicators of effectiveness) in the form of the planned major volumes;

- Utilisation of both established and traditional ways of capturing knowledge (published book volumes) and modern ways - i.e. by dissemination through the website, links to related websites and setting up of a website-based reciprocal and interactive process for exchanging views, information, expertise as a continuous process. The ICOE programme will also experiment with the use of internet-based chat facilities and video-conferencing to enhance the links between and with the regional centres. It will act as a laboratory to develop methods for application by the regional centres.

· Helping to create "transparency" in the actions of the relevant actors and main stake-holders in the environmental field, both with respect to their conduct, their compliance with internal and external rules and their efforts to both transfer best practices and enhance them.

These goals - which include both tangible, well defined specific outputs and the facilitation of a continuous process of informed global networking - require an independent, professionally oriented institution which is also capable of involving the main stakeholders. The process of commissioning, writing, editing, reviewing, finalising and disseminating its 6 major volumes both ensures that there is sufficient focus to avoid dilution, but also creates a series of vehicles onto which the involvement of relevant stakeholders and regional actors can be fastened.

At the end of the first phase of the programme - the production of the planned 6 volumes, ICOE should also have achieved, with and through the process of investigation and publication, the creation of a professionally competent, informed and collaborative global network which by its very existence contributes to sustainable development, dissemination and further enhancement of best practices and the political acceptance and legitimacy of an oil and gas industry which is less separated from "civil society" and its players and more integrated as an active participant - and provider of strategic services to global society - in the "civil society" movement itself.

13. Comments on Oil Spills De: Edmilson Santos (Programa de Energia USP) - edsantos@iee.usp.br

It’s difficult to comment Professor Thomas Walde’s draft on “Environmental Best Practices in the Oil & Gas Industries” when Petroleum comes again to occupy the Blackest space on the international media, now with the sad results in the Islands of Galápagos, Ecuador, an humanity's biological sanctuary.

But I do agree with Professor Walde’s affirmative that the oil industry must do more to conquer its legitimacy. See, for example, the case of Galapagos. It is lamentable that the Brazilian oil company Petrobras has lost such a wonderful opportunity to accomplish a pro-active action and send a team, in the right moment, that means, very fast, to fight the oil spill in such beautiful place. As I read in the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de Sao Paulo, when Petrobras’ boys arrived there nothing could be done.

Remember that the company created a negative image with the two last year major oil spills in Brazil. But I recently followed a presentation from somebody from Petrobras that was directly involved in coping with those accidents and I saw that the company has also acquired an updated and refleshed technology and knowledge on how to manage with such disasters. With a positive, pro-active and fast action to help the Ecuadorians to combat the stain of oil in the very sensible area of Galapagos (and with a strong, but then legitimate, marketing campaign), Petrobras would have re-conquered part of its legitimacy and "social license to operate" (as defined by Professor Walde). An action in Galapagos would have had a favorable impact in the company’s effort to construct the new image of “oil company committed with the environment”. Much more than the recent attempt of changing the name and the logotype, which ended up with the tremendous political “fiasco”. An action in Galapagos would have brought widespread recognition for the company. Its relationship with the environment would have been seen more as something real and not just pure fiction or marketing initiative as it is perceived now. Moreover, a fast help action in Galapagos would have created an enourmous goodwill, helping tremendously the penetration of the name Petrobras and Brazil in Latin America. The company would have noticed that the brand “Brazil” can still be useful and very favorable for its challenges in the region. One “G” from “Greening Galapagos” would have valued for thousands of “Xs”.

If Petrobras continues missing opportunities, we should recognize that the Black destiny contributed at this time with ANP, the Brazilian National Petroleum Agency, because the accident in Galapagos coincided with the issue of ANP’s draft on the resolution that will regulate the transport of petroleum and refined products in the national waters. The draft is available for debate on the ANP’s website – www.anp.org.br . But, since the text is in Portuguese, we tried to translate its major points to English. We would love if you could make some comments.

The transportation activity of bulk petroleum goods by open sea shipping will be subject to the previous and expressed authorization of ANP, including the coastal traffic shipping, the marine support of offshore activities and the long course exports (Here, I make a comment: I don’t understand why the resolution only focuses on long course exports. For today, Brazilian oil exports are made only by Petrobras through its subsidiary Transpetro, which enjoy good reputation by presenting high standards in its operational practices. Surely, for tomorrow, the regulation will be more important, since other upstream companies operating in Brazil will be producing and eventually exporting. But, nowadays, we have already problems with long course imports, since Petrobras very often is not particularly tough when it chooses the ship will bring the oil into Brazil. We also have problems with ships cleaning up tanks in the Brazilian waters. The regulation excludes those cases I don’t know why).

The transportation activities can only be exercised by companies that attain the dispositions of Article 5 from the Law 9.478, 06/08/97 (the New Petroleum Law), and of the Law 9.432, 08/01/97 (I don’t know what is this second law all about. The first is the New Petroleum Law which is very generic in what regards transportation activities).

A Brazilian Shipping Company will have to be constituted under the Brazilian law, with office in the country, and with authorization from the competent organ of the Ministry of Transports.

The authorization request will be instructed by solicitation of the Brazilian Shipping Company with the following documents:

- Cadastral Record Form - Authorization of Operation published on the Federal Government Official Journal (DOU) – this document must be obtained in the Ministry of Transports - Authenticated copy of the registration of ship-owner - Authenticated copy of the Document of Conformity (DOC) – This document is the auditing certificate for the system of safety management of the Brazilian Shipping Company. It will be issued by an independent certifier, authorized to operate on behalf of the Brazilian government, attesting that the Brazilian Shipping Company assists the requirements of the International Code for Management of Safe of Ships and for the Prevention of Pollution (the ISM Code – International Safety Management).

The ANP should issue the authorization for transport operation in the max of 60 days (Here is anotheerr comment: Why should ANP give another authorization if the Ministry of Transport is already giving one?).

ANP can require additional information and then the 60 days will start counting from the delivery of this last information.

The Authorized Brazilian Shipping Company is obliged to: Register all the embarkations used in the approved activity, before their beginning of operation; Execute with what is foreseen in the norms sent by the Marine Authority, the Ministry of Transport, and the organs that regulate the safety and environmental protection.

The no execution of these dispositions will cart the offenders the sanctions foreseen in the applicable legislation

14. Oil companies and the environment De: Carlos Correia - Petrolab - carlos.correia@PETROLAB.COM.BR

The responsibility of the oil companies for the protection of the environment has long been a reason for discussion and controversies. Professor Walde rises an important point, the initiative taken by the International Council for Oil and the Environment, ICOE, and presents his contribution, the draft "vision"paper "Environmental Best Practices in the Oil & Gas Industries: Towards Sustainable Development".

With regards to Professor Edmilson's note, I have the following comments:

Despite the great consideration that I have for the Professor, I only partially agree that there is "too much paper and few actions" on this issue, in Brazil. On the contrary, our environmental legislation related to petroleum activities still lacks regulations on a number of relevant matters. The country's general environmental legislation, however, is spread into a huge number of legal documents, some of them conflicting with one another, thus creating a situation in which the roles of the competent authorities often overlap and the enforcement of the law becomes poor.

It may be the case that not too many actions have been taken, but the ones that have come up deserve our admiration. Concerning Petrobras absence from the Galapagos oil spill, I agree the company lost the opportunity to appear in the international arena as an environmentally-correct enterprise. However, it is a little too much in my opinion, to assert that "Petrobras would have re-conquered a part of its legitimacy and 'social licence to operate' ". I would not say Petrobras has ever lost its legitimacy and I have never heard of any other oil company in the world that holds a 'social licence to operate'. The company's two major spills of last year are lamentable, I agree, but one can recognise Petrobras efforts to restore the damages, and those who know the company more closely are aware of its concern and high investments in the areas of environmental control and the prevention of environmental damages. Finally, the correct address of the National Petroleum Agency is www.anp.gov.br and not www.anp.org.br, as stated in Professor Edmilson's message.

Best regards,

Carlos A. Correia, LL.M. Executive Director

PETROLAB INDUSTRIAL E COMERCIAL LTDA Tel.: +55-79-254-1543 Fax: +55-79-254-1255 E-mail: petrolab@petrolab.com.br Web site: www.petrolab.com.br

15. Commenting on the Brazilian Petroleum Agency New Regulation on Oil Spill Control De: Alain Liger - ALiger@BILLITON.COM

Dear Mr dos Santos,

May I just contribute the general observation that a regulation is just as good as the administration which is in charge of enforcing it. Registering companies under a State Agency and listing ships at least promotes tracability, but if there is no power to and commitment by that Regulatory Authority to seriously look into seaworthiness and security in general through more than rubber stamping documents, it serves nothing and may even be detrimental, as shipping companies might find the excuse that they have complied under the law.

Please note that the above does not mean that your ANP has no powers, is not serious or does not intend to enforce its powers. I just do not know and would not make such judgement. The above is merely a general comment that general law rules are only a part of a process.

16. Comentários sobre a nova regulamentação da ANP para transporte em mar aberto de produtos petroleiros De: Guido Luporini - luporini@iee.usp.br

Prestes a entrar em vigor, a tão esperada Portaria ANP que autoriza o transporte marítimo de petróleo e de seus derivados já está causando polêmica. A Portaria que deveria quebrar o monopólio exclusivo da Petrobrás em mais uma atividade da complexa cadeia do petróleo, na verdade quebrará o monopólio de apenas meia atividade. Sim, pois como diz o Art. 1o da futura Portaria: “Fica sujeita à prévia e expressa autorização da ANP a atividade de transporte a granel de petróleo e seus derivados por meio de navegação de mar aberto, compreendendo as navegações de Cabotagem, de Apoio Marítimo e de Longo Curso para efeito de exportação.” Para efeito de exportação? E a importação? Não está incluída? Exportar pode. Importar não. Como se houvesse alguma diferença entre as duas, além do referencial, é claro.

Não fosse apenas esse fato inusitado, vejamos porque a Portaria precisa ser melhorada antes de ser editada. É importante deixar claro, que os comentários aqui feitos por mim são do ponto de vista ambiental, até porque, mesmo não sendo especialista, caso entrasse no mérito econômico ou político da questão, só pararia de escrever o ano que vem.

A primeira e principal implicação da não inserção das importações no transporte marítimo de Longo Curso nesta Portaria é que o risco ambiental que aparentemente diminuiria com o lançamento das Portarias 014 e 040, respectivamente de fevereiro e março do ano passado, não irá acontecer da maneira como deveria. Pelo simples fato de que as importações representam números muito significativos: cerca de 35% do volume total de óleo transportado por via marítima e 98% do volume total de óleo transportado por navegação de Longo Curso.

Além disso, brigas judiciais decorrentes de acidentes como o ocorrido com o Cargueiro de bandeira cipriota Vergina II, em São Sebastião, no ano passado, quando ele se chocou com o píer sul do Terminal Almirante Barroso, derramando 68.000 litros de óleo na água do canal, ainda vão continuar. Nessa ocasião, o proprietário do navio responsabilizava a Transpetro pelo acidente, que por sua vez, colocava a culpa no capitão do navio.

Acontece que o Brasil é signatário de vários acordos internacionais, mas as empresas transportadoras, principalmente as de bandeira de países do terceiro mundo, não. Razão principal de toda essa encrenca. Tudo bem que naquele caso o óleo estava vindo da Bacia de Campos e, portanto, estaria abrangido pela nova Portaria, mas estou apenas me referindo como um exemplo.

Entre os acordos e convenções internacionais que o Brasil é signatário e que podem ser utilizados como instrumentos de defesa estão: o TOVALOP - Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Converning Liability for Oil Pollution, um entendimento voluntário entre os transportadores de petróleo, de 1969, administrado pelo ITOPF - The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited, que determina aos signatários assumirem certas obrigações - mesmo que não sejam responsáveis pela poluição -, no intuito de garantir indenização de terceiros (governos, entidades particulares, etc.) diretamente afetados pelo derrame de óleo, custeio das ações necessárias para afastar a ameaça de poluição ou reduzi-la e, daquelas necessárias para recompor o meio ambiente nas condições anteriores ao acidente. Por outro lado, o transportador mantém seus direitos de ser ressarcido por terceiros, quando for provado serem estes os reais causadores dos prejuízos. As indenizações, são garantidas pela compra de um seguro por parte dos proprietários de petroleiros.

O CRISTAL - Contract Regarding a Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution – contrato, assinado em 1971, relativo ao aumento do limite de responsabilidade (previstos no Tovalop) dos proprietários e fretadores de navios petroleiros que estabelece a criação de um fundo caixa específico para indenizações causadas pela poluição, onde participam, além dos proprietários e afretadores de navios, qualquer outra empresa envolvida na produção, refino, compra e venda de petróleo ou, mesmo, que receba para seu próprio consumo. No Cristal, as indenizações são pagas pelos proprietários das cargas.

E a Convenção Internacional Para a Prevenção da Poluição por Navios (Marpol 73/78), à qual a nova Portaria se baseia, para a emissão dos certificados de prevenção contra a poluição. Sua aplicação em outros países conseguiu que a quantidade de óleo introduzida nos mares e oceanos fosse bastante reduzida ou, até mesmo, completamente eliminada em algumas áreas. Ela exige, entre outras coisas:

? adoção de casco duplo, localização do tanque de lastro "protegida", tanques de lastro segregados (tanques exclusivos para lastro. Ficam vazios quando o navio está cheio de óleo e, cheios de água, quando o navio está vazio. São posicionados onde tiver maior probabilidade de ocorrer o impacto em caso de uma colisão ou encalhe) e outros obrigações; ? manutenção a bordo de um plano de emergência contra a poluição em petroleiros com 150 TPB ou mais, aprovado pelo país no qual o navio é registrado e; ? adoção de áreas especiais, de alta sensibilidade à poluição por petróleo, que são protegidas por regulamentações que restringem o despejo de águas oleosas em suas águas.

A Marpol 73/78 pode ser considerada hoje a norma internacional mais importante para prevenir não só a poluição causada por petróleo, mas também outros tipos de poluição (lixo, esgoto, NOx, Sox, etc).

Esta nova Portaria da ANP deveria fazer com que um sistema dúbio, baseado em vários acordos, fosse substituído por normas definitivas de certificação e fiscalização. Entre elas, pode-se citar os Certificados de Gerenciamento de Segurança (CGS), que é documento de auditoria do sistema de gerenciamento de segurança da embarcação; o Certificado Internacional de Prevenção da Poluição por Óleo (IOPP), ambos emitidos pela Sociedade Classificadora (Ver Portaria 040 de 03/2000); e o Certificado de Seguro ou outra garantia financeira referente à responsabilidade civil por danos causados por poluição de óleo, aceito pela Autoridade Marítima Brasileira.

Outro problema importante a ser lembrado, e que pode ter influenciado esta decisão de não incluir as importações na Portaria, é o fato da Transpetro afretar cerca de 50 navios de diversos países, os quais, obviamente, teriam que se enquadrar nesta nova legislação para poderem continuar trazendo petróleo da Argentina, Venezuela ou Oriente Médio. Esta obrigação certamente acarretaria custos relativamente altos para a Transpetro e seus parceiros.

Outra questão de suma importância é o fato de que o Registro da Propriedade Marítima (transcrição do título da propriedade da embarcação no Tribunal Marítimo), documento exigido pela ANP para autorização da operação das embarcações, seja apenas exigido para embarcações com arqueação bruta superior a 100 ton. Tonelagem de arqueação é o volume total do interior do navio, expresso em unidades de cem pés cúbicos, que correspondem a 2,832 metros cúbicos. Isto significa que embarcações com capacidade de transporte abaixo de 250 metros cúbicos estarão fora desta Portaria. O problema aumentará quando, num futuro próximo, os chamados “shuttle tankers” estiverem operando. São pequenas embarcações, de baixo calado, que fazem viagens de abastecimento freqüentes entre os grandes terminais petrolíferos e, principalmente, conectando os grandes terminais aos portos fluviais e/ou portos marítimos de menor porte. Estas embarcações, sem a devida fiscalização, tendem a se tornar pequenas bombas flutuante. Quem se lembra da balsa que afundou no rio Negro, no Pará, no ano passado?

17. Ensinando a navegar em outros mares De: Edmilson Santos (Programa de Energia USP) - edsantos@iee.usp.br

Ainda que a comunidade ambiental continue a polemizar um pouco sobre a indicação do Sr. Hamilton Casara para a presidência do IBAMA, tomo a coragem de concluir que a maior parte das pessoas especialistas entende esta nomeação como benéfica para o meio ambiente e, principalmente, para as questões florestais deste país. Contudo, também apelo para que nos mobilizemos e ensinemos o Sr. Hamilton a navegar em outros mares. Em particular, toda a problemática de poluição marinha e fluvial, que estamos discutindo neste Fórum, deve ser completamente desconhecida ao Sr. Hamilton e exigirá dele decisões importantes.

Por exemplo, por mais que ele esteja familiarizado com o SIVAM e a sua importância para a Amazônia, caberá também ao IBAMA dar o aval ou não ao Projeto Sivamar, isto é, o Sistema de Vigilância Marítima, para fins, entre outros, do controle da poluição marítima despejada por navios petroleiros ou instalações offshore de produção de petróleo.

O Sivamar é tão fundamental para o país como o é o Projeto Sivam, mas as autoridades têm exitado frente aos custos que tal projeto representará. Na verdade, nós da comunidade científica brasileira, também não estamos contribuindo muito, cada universidade tentando vender projetos mirabolantes para o governo ao invés de juntarmos esforços, analisarmos o que desejamos para o país em termos de infra-estrutra de Vigilância Marítima; para que o desejamos; que vantagens esperamos alcançar; quais os custos que pretendemos arcar; como podemos minimizar estes custos com as infra-estruturas já existentes no país; como podemos maximizar a utilização de mão de obra especializada já existente nos vários centros de pesquisa e universidades. Ao invés de pensarmos em um Projeto Sivamar coerente e integrado, que pudesse ser abraçado e tocado pelas autoridades, ficamos nos degladiando por recursos miseráveis, uns tentando instalar antenas de satélites não se sabe para que, outros tentando monopolizar o conhecimento e as informações que seriam úteis para a vigilância matítima; outros desenvolvendo atividades extremamente sofisticadas e avançadas, mas escondendo o jogo para que o resto da comunidade não aprenda como pode controlar as suas atividades industriais maiores. Enfim, novamente devemos trazer um pouco de ética aqui.

Ainda vale dizer que o Sr. Hamilton deverá posicionar-se frente às decisões da Petrobras de cortar a região amazônica com gasodutos e oleodutos. Pesquisas têm demonstrado a dificuldade ou mesmo precaridade desta estratégia, pois o impacto de um gasoduto na floresta é muito grande, ainda que pareça irrisório quando comparamos a área ocupada pelo duto (mesmo incluindo a sua fase de construção). Em particular, a ligação entre Coari e Manaus, para levar o gás natural dos campos de Urucu e Juruá para as termelétricas de Manaus, merece ser estudada e reestudada, pois o discurso da Petrobrás ainda precisa ser comprado através de Relatórios de Impactos Ambientais que possam ser amplamente discutidos pela comunidade. Apenas uma análise rigorosa e amplamente aberta para a comunidade poderá garantir que tal obra tem realmente um baixo impacto. A sociedade precisa saber o que estamos sacrificando em termos de biodiversidade de flora e fauna, e o que estamos introduzindo de impacto em comunidades locais e indígenas, com esta grande obra.

Além do mais, trata-se, sem dúvida, de uma obra de referência, pois, dependendo do posicionamento do IBAMA com relação ao gasoduto Coari/Manaus, estaremos viabilizando ou inviabilizando outras obras de magnitude ainda maior, como o gasoduto de Coari a Porto Velho, de Coari a Marabá ou mesmo uma série de oportunidades que nos permitiriam trazer o gás natural peruano do campo de Camisea para os mercados brasileiros.

O RIMA do gasoduto Coari/Manaus já deve estar em fase de estudos pelo IBAMA, porém tem sido tratado pelas autoridades e pela Petrobras como segredo de Estado a ser trancado a Sete Chaves, o que já não contribui no sentido de legitimar e obter o aval da sociedade, como bem explorou o Professor Thomas Walde em sua contribuição para este Fórum. Caberá ao IBAMA abrir os dossiês à sociedade e expor o projeto ao debate mais amplo, pois o seu resultado tem uma importância muito significativa para todo o plenejamento energético da região amazônica.

Em não se viabilizando as opções de gasoduto, lembramos que o gás natural da região amazônica ainda pode encontrar formas viáveis de valorização econômica através de plantas de síntese de combustíveis líquidos a partir do gás natural (em iglês, são as plantas de GTL, gas-to-liquids, em português são as plantas de LSGN – líquidos sintéticos de gás natural). Em princípio, esta opção nos parece mais realista do que gasodutos, pois explora a rica via fluvial da região, sem impactos maiores na derrubada das matas. Contudo, novamente, ao IBAMA caberá a missão talvez ainda mais difícil de regulamentar e controlar o transporte de combustíveis via fluvial, pois os volumes a serem transportados serão muito muito maiores do que os atuais. Isto envolverá, provavelmente, uma expansão do SIVAM ou uma interação entre o SIVAM e o SIVAMAR.

Pesquisa de Campo

Para que possamos falar em ética, devemos conhecer um pouco mais da cultura do empresário do setor de petróleo e gás natural no Brasil. A seguir, apresentamos uma pesquisa de campo sendo realizada por um dos nossos colegas forenses. Nos pareceu muito interessante e onde a nossa comunidade forense pode adicionar grande valor apenas respondendo o questionário. A resposta ao mesmo é, evidentemente, voluntária. Porém, pregamos a todos que dediquem um pequeno minuto para responder as questões que seguem, pois, sem pesquisas de campo similares, realizadas por pessoas sérias, pouco podemos avançar em termos de desenvolvermos casos de estudos sobre a realidade brasileira. Dependeremos eternamente de literatura internacional. Por outro lado, o Gustavo se compromete a trazer-nos neste Fórum um resumo dos seus resultados.

18. Pesquisa sobre cultura empresarial do setor petróleo e gás no Brasil DE:Gustavo Goncalves - Gustavo_Goncalves@praxair.com

Prezado Professor Edmilson,

Tenho acompanhado com muito interesse seus e-mails do Forum de Energia e, desde já, gostaria de lhe agradecer pela excelente iniciativa, que vem ao encontro das necessidade de todo o mercado de energia brasileiro. Nesta oportunidade, gostaria de lhe pedir auxílio com relação à nota abaixo. Se trata de um amigo de faculdade, atualmente trabalhando na Inglaterra, e que me pediu para auxilia-lo na pesquisa abaixo. Acredito que se fosse possível a inserção da mesmo em nosso próximo Fórum; a pesquisa que ele vem desenvolvendo abrangeria um sem numero de profissionais da área, proporcionando uma base de consulta extremamente interessante e relevante.

Independentemente de qualquer resultado, agradeço-lhe antecipadamente.

Atenciosamente,

Gustavo Gonçalves Gerente de Marketing & Desenvolvimento de Negócios - Serviços White Martins Gases Industriais S.A.

QUESTIONÁRIO DE PESQUISA PARA MAPEAMENTO DA CULTURA EMPRESARIAL DO SETOR DE PETRÓLEO E GÁS NO BRASIL (Versão em português)

Caro senhor/senhora,

Como um profissional que trabalha no setor brasileiro da indústria do petróleo e gás, você esta convidado/convidada a participar de uma pesquisa com o propósito de "mapear a cultura empresarial" neste setor. Esta pesquisa é privada e esta sendo feita como parte dos requisitos para atingir o titulo de Master of Business Administration na Henley Management College, Inglaterra. Sou brasileiro e residente a onze anos na Inglaterra onde trabalho como gerente de marketing e vendas da Kvaerner Oilfield Products.

A pesquisa consta de um questionário que pode ser bastante intrigante. É genérico e não visa as características culturais de um país especifico. Já foi aplicado inúmeras vezes mundialmente. Ele simula situações onde o leitor, as vezes, pode achar difícil definir sua posição. Neste caso, vale o seu bom senso e percepção no momento da sua resposta. É necessário que todas as perguntas sejam respondidas.

Minha pesquisa baseia-se nos estudos do Professor Terry Garisson sobre mapeamento cultural empresarial, portanto, este questionário é protegido por lei de copyright (@Terry Garisson, 1998). Seu resultado será de domínio público. Sua participação é agradecida, no entanto, é opcional. Confirmo que sua resposta será tratada confidencialmente.

Atenciosamente, Marcelo Taulois Londres, dezembro 2000.

Parte 1 - Dados Pessoais: Respostas

Sexo: ( ) Masculino ( ) Feminino

Idade:

Nacionalidade ( ) Brasileiro ( ) Estrangeiro

Profissão: ( ) Atividade técnica ou administrativa. ( ) Chefe de setor ou departamento. ( ) Gerente, diretor or presidente.

Você trabalha para: ( ) uma companhia Brasileira no setor de óleo e gás ( ) a Petrobrás ( ) uma companhia estrangeira, com presença no Brasil, no setor de óleo e gás.

Você trabalha no setor: ( ) Upstream ( ) Downstream ( ) ou ambos

Qualificação: ( ) Até segundo grau ( ) Universitário ( ) Pós-graduação, mestrado ou doutorado.

Parte 2:

Metodologia do questionário:

Todas as respostas do questionário a seguir devem ser respondidas nos quadros a direita, graduadas de 1 a 5, da seguinte forma:

1 = Não é assim que fazemos as coisas em nosso país 2 3 4 5 = É assim que meu país é na verdade

O questionário e baseado em situações onde você terá a opção para discordar, "Não é assim que fazemos as coisas no nosso país", resposta número 1 ou para concordar, “É assim que meu país é na verdade". Caso você tenha opções intermediárias, use as respostas 2, 3 ou 4 de acordo com a sua inclinação.

Perguntas:

"Tipicamente, no meu país, as empresas consideram os acionistas como os seus principais parceiros nos negócios, e acreditam na supremacia do mercado de ações. Nós somos muito capitalistas”.

"Existe uma mentalidade gerencial orientada para o lucro em meu país. O.k. podem ser que nem todos concordem com isso, mas, aqui, o departamento financeiro é quem dita as regras, e não engenheiros”.

"Nós temos uma forte crença na democracia, na economia de mercado e no valor das mudanças. Nós não nos vemos presos ao passado do nosso país”.

"Religião? Isso tem pouca influencia na maneira em que as coisas são feitas neste país”.

"Tipicamente, o setor privado no meu país tem uma visão empresarial e pensa em curto prazo. Se uma empresa vai decretar falência, esta não espera contar com a ajuda do governo ou de um banco. E impossível ter assistência do governo!”.

"De fato, no meu país, as pessoas reclamam com freqüência do governo, principalmente quando ele aumenta impostos destinados ao setor social. Pacto social entre governo e empresas para criar mais empregos? Governo e indústria juntos para criar empregos? Estatização do setor industrial? Isso não é com a gente".

"A maioria dos diretores de empresas aqui não acredita na participação dos empregados na hora de tomar decisões (por exemplo, via conselhos de trabalhadores ou diretorias de supervisão). Eles pensam que o lugar certo para estas decisões é a reunião de diretoria. Portanto, no nosso país, nós não concordamos com o principio de gerência participativa”.

"Nós acreditamos em competição, portanto, no nosso país não aceitamos barganha”.

"Nós não temos um grande setor público ou mesmo burocracia governamental. É assim que queremos continuar. Burocracia só atrapalha”.

"O que você sabe”, no meu país, é mais importante do que “Quem você conhece”.

"Aqui, as vezes, a preocupação com progresso tecnológico parece ser maior do que a dedicada às próprias pessoas."

“No meu país, as empresas, tipicamente, recorrem mais aos acionistas do que a empréstimos bancários para obter financiamento. Não existem relações acolhedoras com bancos amigáveis. De fato, geralmente os bancos sequer detém ações em empresas para as quais eles emprestam dinheiro”.

"Benefícios e taxas sociais no meu pais são relativamente baixos e nos não temos uma mentalidade de ”Estado do bem-estar social“, o qual, para ser sincero, oferece proteção em excesso”.

"Na maioria das empresas, promoções são baseadas no desempenho imediato no trabalho e não em um histórico de sucesso ao longo dos anos. O seu salário é determinado pela função que você desempenha na empresa. Tempo de serviço e cargo já não significam muito”.

"Empresas, neste pais, não conseguem bancar treinamento para funcionários e financiam só o necessário para melhorar o desempenho deles. O.k., então os empregados vão embora. Mas essa é a natureza do mercado”.

"A diretoria tende a ver os sindicatos como problema e não uma forma de ajuda. Por que? Porque eles atrapalham planos de mudança e aumentam o custo da mão de obra”.

“A respeito do controle acionário da maioria das grandes empresas do meu país, a verdade é que elas podem ser adquiridas facilmente. Investidores e acionistas não estão interessados na nacionalidade da firma controladora. O país é certamente mais capitalista do que socialista”.

"As pessoas na maioria das empresas parecem ter uma tendência natural para quererem que as coisas aconteçam. Aqui, ações falam mais alto do que palavras e tempo é dinheiro”.

"O.k., a gente comete erros as vezes, mas concluímos o que fazemos. Não existe uma cultura de procurar culpados. A não ser no meio jornalístico, onde eles são muito críticos”.

"No meu país, nos não misturamos lazer (e família) com trabalho. Problemas pessoais são tratados com atenção, mas não gostamos da idéia de discuti-los no trabalho. Nem mesmo manter relações com colegas fora do ambiente de trabalho”.

"No meu país, as pessoas do mundo de negócios falam abertamente, até sem muita diplomacia. Elas procuram sempre evitar mal entendidos e não gostam de silêncios e de situações que provoquem desconforto”.

"A pessoas aqui não sentem vergonha caso cometam uma ”gafe “, digam ou façam alguma coisa errada. Eles seguem em frente”.

"Nós temos uma tendência a seguir a hierarquia no meu país. O chefe é o chefe, embora não a ponto de dominar todos”.

"Aqui, nós valorizamos a individualidade tanto quanto o trabalho em equipe mas nos não damos importância mais à individualidade. No entanto, os gerentes mais jovens procuram” brilhar “e se esforçam mais”.

"Nós não temos uma cultura machista onde homem é homem, no sentido figurativo e mulher é mulher. Mas não somos tão cuidadosos com isso”.

"Nós temos brindes na empresa, camisas ”pins“ etc, mas estes são mais para promover a marca da empresa do que apego social. De fato, nós temos pouca cerimônia nas atividades na empresa”.

“Nós temos um comportamento bem informal aqui no nosso país. Existem, genericamente, algumas regras e códigos de comportamento (vestimenta, comunicação, etc.), mas nada que seja obrigatório. Certamente, não temos que vestir uniformes ou adotar símbolos que representam a nossa companhia.”

“Nós gostamos de estrangeiros. Nos gostamos muito de estrangeiros que investem no nosso pais .”

“Nós não temos um senso de obrigação social, como por exemplo, tentar arrumar um emprego para um parente próximo, como acontece em certo países.”

“Nós tentamos ser diretos e claros em todos aspectos de uma negociação, ao ponto de fazer uso de contratos escritos”.

Obrigado, você completou o questionário……..

Caso for remeter sua resposta por email, por favor, clique o ícone "SALVAR" , feche o arquivo e envie para: marcelo.taulois@kvaerner.com

Caso deseja enviar pelo correio, imprima sua resposta e envie para : Marcelo Taulois, Kvaerner do Brasil, Rua Rodrigo Silva 8 sala 601, Centro, Rio de Janeiro, 20011-040, Brasil.

Anúncio de Eventos, Livros e Sites

19. Considerem os seguintes eventos

1st International Congress on Biomass for Metal Production & Electricity Generation De: Rocha - jdr1203@uol.com.br

Dear Colleagues,

Please, find enclosed the web site address to the 1st International Congress on Biomass for Metal Production & Electricity Generation, Belo Horizonte, Brazil from 8-11 October, 2001.

Please feel free to publicize it among your colleages and co-workers.

http://www.issbrazil.org/congress1.asp

Regards,

José D. Rocha

Latin Gas 2001 De: Amanda Wellbeloved - amanda@glopac.com

LATIN GAS 2001 Business Opportunities: Upstream & Downstream Gas Strategies, Projects, LNG, Gas-Power Energy Finance Organised & Hosted By Global Pacific & Partners - Houston, Johannesburg, London Sheraton Hotel, Rio de Janeiro - 2 & 3 May 2001

Latin Gas 2001 will provide a unique Continent-wide view of gas opportunities and developments from key Companies (Majors & Independents), Governments and NOCs. Speakers will treat with all major projects on the gas value chain, gas supply-demand, pricing, new ventures, terms and regulation, risk issues, gas-fuel competition, privatization of gas-energy assets, business issues and strategic implications, including IPPs, corporate strategies, alliances and partnerships, and investments in gas-power, and energy finance. Global Pacific & Partners will release its new Latin Gas Strategies in the 21st Century Report at the Conference.

To register and for information: contact global.pacific@pixie.co.za

20. Considerem os seguintes livros

Dados os problemas de comércio internacional tão explorados neste Fórum, acreditamos que a seguinte sugestão de livro é bastante pertinente:

Book Review - De: Robert Pritchard - robert@RESOURCESLAW.NET

It is a personal pleasure to have been asked to review the excellent book:

Mirian Kene Omalu, "NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY", Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999 ISBN 90-411-1076-3

The Centre for Energy Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP) was established a little over 20 years ago in the aftermath of the OPEC crisis. To me, what most distinguishes the CEPMLP from other institutions of educational excellence is its special focus of interest on "legal infrastructure", that is on the body of legal rules concerned with the conduct of economic activity. This book is actually a manifestation of that special focus. In 1992, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund published the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. These guidelines endorsed national treatment, non-discrimination among foreign investors, fair and equitable treatment, protection and security. Although the Guidelines did not clarify international law or lay down rules on foreign investment, they nonetheless influenced the fundamental provisions on investment which have now appeared in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the two international treaties which are the subject of this book. In the contemporary world of global investment, no nation-state can be a unitary player. State sovereignty has entered a new era. As Omalu sees this: "The idea of real sovereignty is substantially undermined by the actual effect of world economic interdependence which can cause billions of dollars to move across boundaries with a flick of a computer key, and creates speedy cross-boundary impacts of interest rate fluctuations, tax and fiscal policy, deregulation, and the like." To be a player in the international economic system, the state must actualise and exhibit its sovereignty by participating in the international regimes that not only regulate international trade but also now regulate international investment. International investment regimes have been created to handle the collective suboptimality that would otherwise emerge from individual state behaviour. In part, this is a consequence of realisation of the excesses and shortsightedness of the nationalization policies of host countries in the 1970s. Today, isolation is tantamount to a failure to realise the state¹s potential for economic development and political influence.

Both NAFTA and the ECT are the offspring of market reform in the post-communist world, NAFTA having come into force in 1984 and the ECT in 1998. Their impact, perhaps underwhelming at first, is having an increasingly pervasive effect. The NAFTA is a trilateral treaty that brought Canada, Mexico and the US into the North-American free trade area. The ECT is a unique multilateral treaty, limited in scope to the energy sector, which establishes rights relating to both trade and investment within that sector. The ECT breaks away from the mould of other treaties by making governments accountable directly to aggrieved investors before arbitral tribunals for breaches of the Treaty.

The importance of host states attracting investors by offering them the security of market-based economic systems ‹ underpinned by market-oriented legal systems ‹ cannot be overemphasised. The purpose of market-oriented legal systems is to define and protect the rights of the private sector against encroachment by government, to remove special privileges accorded to state-owned enterprises and support fundamental business relationships between private parties ‹ by reducing risk and transaction costs between parties. Both NAFTA and the ECT seek to do this. They also seek to establish a global level playing field for investors.

Omalu’s research indicates that NAFTA and the ECT seem to be having a positive influence on the rate of inflow of foreign investment although she emphasises that the two treaties are only one of many factors that influence this. She reminds us that the effects of such treaties should not be overshadowed by more fundamental factors such as geological potential, political stability, macro-economic policy, exchange rate volatility and the like. However, although a decision to invest is usually based on technical merit, the rate of return has to be sufficient to offset risk factors and Omalu convincingly explains how treaties such as the NAFTA and the ECT serve to reduce risk. Thus they are likely to become the way forward in expanding international investment and trade.

Omalu emphasises that the two treaties should be seen as a process or a continuous mechanism rather than a static, two-dimensional picture. She points out that the two treaties have resulted in a proliferation of contacts between the participating states: "The long-term significance of NAFTA and the ECT, as a whole, stretches out beyond the investment, or even economic, sphere. They both increase economic links. Consequently, they draw diverse nations into closer contacts. This results in a dramatic upsurge in the number and range of formal and informal transactions between citizens of the participating states."

As a lawyer who has practised in the energy industry for over 30 years, I have come to the conclusion that practising lawyers and their clients traditionally have placed too high a value on carefully drafted investment agreements to minimise risk. This can create a false sense of security for investors. Greater efforts should in my opinion be made by governments on creating market-oriented legal systems. As a generalisation, I believe that the time has arrived when many private investors will place at least equal emphasis on the macro aspects of investment security as they do on the micro. What this means is that each country’s investment flows will be largely determined in the future by an aggregation of highly idiosyncratic investment decisions by investors who are increasingly influenced by whether the country in question offers a market-oriented legal system or it doesn’t.

Omalu is a Nigerian law graduate who, having been awarded a Foreign and Commonwealth Office scholarship, came to Dundee to enter the CEPMLP’s PhD program under the supervision of Professor Thomas Walde. This book is a product of her doing so. With it, Omalu has made an important and insightful contribution to the advancement of international knowledge and understanding in a field which is of increasingly critical importance to world economic development. She is now a lawyer with Shell International in London. This book is well researched and well written. It is commended to government officials, lawyers and law students everywhere.

Robert Pritchard Pritchard Udovenya International Lawyers Sydney February 2001

21. Considerem os seguintes sites

Infopetro De: Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida - edmar@novell.ie.ufrj.br

Caros colegas,

Voces ja podem ter acesso ao provedor infopetro que estamos desenvolvendo. Este provedor disponibiliza informações e análise sobre o setor petróleo e gás natural.

http://www.ie.ufrj.br/infopetro

Atenciosamente,

Edmar Luiz Fagundes de Almeida Instituto de Economia - UFRJ Av. Pasteur 250, Sala 22 CEP 22290-240 Tel: (21) 295-1447 ramal 221 Fax: (21) 541-8148 e-mail: edmar@ie.ufrj.br http://www.energia.ie.ufrj.br


Consulte o banco de dados da Rede CTA-UJGOIAS O Universo Jurídico do Estado de Goiás http://www.ujgoias.com.br  - ujgoias@ujgoias.com.br 

FONTE D'ÁGUA - Informativo sobre Água em português do FLORIDA CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES - http://www.ces.fau.edu   Para falar com a coordenação do Fonte d'Água, escreva para e-mail: fontedagua-request@ces.fau.edu 

"A hora em que você precisa fazer alguma coisa é quando ninguém mais quer fazê-la ou quando todos dizem que é impossível." Eudora Welty

Rede CTA-UJGOIAS - Consultant, Trader and Adviser Pelo Desenvolvimento Limpo de um Novo Mercado Financeiro! Sindicato dos Economistas, no Estado de São Paulo cta@sindecon-esp.org.br 

amyra@netdoctors.com.br  - www.sindecon-esp.org.br